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I
INTRODUCTION
Should the law give private individuals conditional permission to use
deadly force in their own defense? Moral considerations pull both ways. On
one side is the popular idea that each individual should possess a personal
privilege to use deadly force in self-defense because the Constitution
explicitly guarantees the right to life. Statutory law shows proper respect for
the latter by recognizing the former.' According to such a view, it would be
inconsistent, if not perverse, to affirm the right to life but refuse to permit the
use of means reasonably thought necessary to repel aggressive threats to self-
preservation. In the popular mind, bona fide uses of this personal privilege
are laudatory and not merely exculpatory. On the other side is the idea that
killings, of whatever kind, are serious wrongs and that the law ought not
permit them except when they serve a compelling social purpose. Sir
Matthew Hale, writing in 1678, articulated this idea as follows:
If a man kill another by misfortune, yet he shall forfeit his goods in strictness of law, in
respect of the great favour the law hath to the life of a man, and to the end that men
should use all care, diligence and circumspection in all they do, that no such hurt
ensue by their actions.
2
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1. For instance, a controversial statute enacted by the Nebraska legislature over the governor's
veto would have made the "right of self-defense" a robust "right" and not merely a defense available
to a charge of homicide:
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska:
Section 1. No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for
protecting, by any means necessary, himself, his family, or his real or personal property, or when
coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of aggravated assault,
armed robbery, holdup, rape, murder, or any other heinous crime.
When substantial question of self-defense in such a case shall exist, which needs legal
investigation or court action for the full determination of the facts, and the defendant's actions
are subsequently found justified under the intent of this section, the State of Nebraska shall
indemnify or reimburse such a defendant for all loss of time, legal fees, court costs or other
expense involved in his defense.
Law of June 5, 1969, ch. 233, § 1 (codified at 1969 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29- 114) (quoted in BAUNI &
BAUM, LAw OF SELF-DEFENSE 58 (1970)), repealed by Law of Aug. 27, 1971, Neb. LB 187. § I.
Nebraska's current self-defense law is found at 1979 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1409 to -1417.
2. N. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307. at 298 (1969). The
stringency of the duty to take care that one's actions not cause the death of another person is diticult
for us to comprehend fully. First, we have trouble seeing the justification lor- what came very close to
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Nevertheless, allowing private individuals to use deadly force in their own
defense has a long history. Statutes expressly privileging the use of lethal
force against felons in self-defense are found as early as the sixteenth century.
An English statute in 1532 removed the threat of punishment from those
good citizens who killed robbers, murderers, and burglars in self-defense. 3
This early statute did not, however, create any blanket right to use deadly
force in self defense. In fact, by restricting the permissible use of deadly force
to encounters with felons, the 1532 statute seems to have partially deputized
private individuals to act on behalf of the whole community. 4 If this
observation is true, the statute's justification appealed to the public interest
against felonious persons and not to a private interest in self-protection. Two
considerations are offered in support of this claim. Defensive killings not
involving felonious assault remained punishable by forfeiture of property and,
even if excusable, required the king's pardon. 5 In a potentially deadly
strict liability for homicide. Second, we tend to forget that life was then much more fragile than now.
The most trivial injuries might have caused death. Minor cuts frequently became septic. Grave
complications often attended knocks on the head. Many people died as a result of broken bones.
Almost any sort of injury could prove fatal. Thus, a man might show very great restraint in warding
off an aggressor, taking pains not to strike a vital area, but in using any degree of force might inflict
an injury which in some months' time resulted in death.
3. The 1532 statute said that a person who killed anyone attempting to rob him in his own
house or on or near the highway should not incur a forfeiture of his goods. 24 Henry 8 ch. 5 (1532).
In so saying, the statute settled an earlier ambiguity. Until its enactment, there was a question
whether those who killed felons in defense of life and property (it being immaterial whose life or
property were imperiled) should be liable to forfeiture and so receive the same treatment as those
who killed in self-defense subsequent to a personal quarrel. Cf N. HURNARD, supra note 2, at x.
4. Private citizens were only "partially" deputized because the killing remained excusable and
pardonable rather than justifiable. As Pollock and Maitland have observed,
Altogether in our common law the sphere ofjustifiable homicide was very narrow, and the cases
which fell within it were those which in old times would have been regarded less as cases of
legitimate self-defense than as executions, for thefur manifestus had been ipsofacto an outlaw.
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 479 (2d ed. 1898 & reprint 1968) (footnote
omitted). The 1532 statute expressly removed the liability of such killers to forfeiture. In theory,
other sorts of pardonable homicide (such as those by misadventure) continued to give rise to liability
to forfeiture. By the 18th century, however, judges commonly permitted juries to bring in verdicts of
not guilty in order to obviate the liability to punishment and the need for pardon. J.F. Stephen
concluded that "[tihe law upon this subject may thus be considered as having fallen into desuetude
in the course of the eighteenth century." J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 76-
77 (1883). He then summarized the statute of 1828 which provides that "no punishment or
forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who shall kill another by misfortune, or in his own defence,
or in any other manner without felony." Id.
5. Jury accounts of aggravated assaults which provoked a defensive killing often went to great
lengths to establish that the defensive use of deadly force was necessary, apparently with the aim of
increasing the chances that the king would grant a pardon. For example, there is the recounted jury
verdict of a homicide proceeding against one Peter Wyth who killed Richard Faucun subsequent to
Richard's aggravated assault against Peter.
Richard attacked Peter, striking him on the shoulder with a stick, which broke; Peter's own stick
fell from his hand and Richard picked it up and chased him with it; Peter fled as far as he could
to a certain dyke which he could not cross; turning back thence he fled to the muddy bed of a
stream and went in up to the knees; Richard hit him again with his stick, which also broke, and
then drew his knife and struck him through the arm, meaning to kill him. Peter repeatedly
begged for mercy, but Richard would not spare him, but assaulted him more lethally. As Peter
could not cross the stream without drowning nor escape elsewhere alive without defending
himself, he drew his sword and struck Richard on the head.
N. HURNARD, supra note 2, at 301.
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encounter with a felon, however, things were different. Not only was there no
duty to retreat, there was an affirmative obligation to use deadly force if the
alternative were leaving a murderous felon at liberty. An innocent victim
capable of defending himself who, instead, ran from a potential murderer,
would be guilty of misprision. 6
Commentators were careful to distinguish between a person who killed
merely for the sake of his own skin, and a person who, in killing a felon, was
performing a public benefit. Thus, the 1532 statute did not change the long
standing legal requirement that those who killed in self-defense subsequent to
a personal quarrel be punished by forfeiture of chattels.
In much of Europe, it was also a common requirement that those who
killed only in defense of themselves (as opposed to those who killed on behalf
of the whole community) be required to pay compensation to the decedent's
relatives. 7 Apparently, this requirement stemmed from the thought that even
in cases of excusable homicide, some type of emendation was called for even
if punishment was not appropriate. 8 Although the practice of requiring
compensation payments to the aggrieved relatives had fallen into disuse in
England by the sixteenth century, on some parts of the continent the
requirement continued in force until the seventeenth century. 9 Requiring the
king's pardon for homicide faded away in the eighteenth century, but the
6. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1003-04 (2d ed. 1969). Any guilt for misprision
would not result in conviction, however. Clearly, the law put those who faced aggravated assault by
felons in a difficult position. The 1532 statute relieved them of criminal liability. Furthermore,
although required to employ deadly force against their felonious attackers, users of such force would
be liable for an excusable homicide requiring the king's pardon to escape punishment.
I am indebted to Don B. Kates, Jr. for bringing this citation to my attention.
7. The compensation requirement may have been a holdover from Norman rule, under which
homicide generally was treated as a private, compensable wrong unless it occurred in secret,
"clanculo." Secret killings were a crime against the crown as well as a wrong against the decedent's
relatives and the king was entitled to forfeiture while the victim's family was entitled to revenge and
compensation. A special fund called a "murdrum" was established, resources for which were drawn
from a tax upon districts where homicide was clanculo. The fund's purpose was to provide an
incentive for reporting homicides (whether by misadventure or otherwise) of strangers, most of
whom turned out to be Frenchmen. After 1267, the distinction between French and Anglo-Saxon
homicides was lost and murdrum no longer applied in cases of death by misadventure. In England,
killing in self-defense against a deliberate and aggravated assault had never given rise to a right of
aggrieved relatives to compensation because any such right was forfeited by the crime or attempted
crime. Killings in self-defense stemming from a quarrel, however, continued to be subject to court-
imposed compensation for the family of the deceased and the king's official pardon was required. Cf
N. HURNARD, supra note 2, at xii-xiv.
8. In such instances, the survivor was guilty of homicide se defetidendo. "Where the law judges a
man guilty of homicide se defendendo, there must be some precendent quarrel in which both parties
always are, or at least may justly be supposed to have been, in some fault .... ." I PLEAS OF THE
CROWN ch. 28, § 24 (Leach 6th ed. 1788). Blackstone distinguished between excusable, justifiable,
and felonious homicide and placed se defendendo in the first category because he thought it carried
with it some degree of guilt. When the practice of requiring compensation payments to the
decedent's relatives ended, however, the significance of distinguishing between excusable and
justifiable homicide was lost. Any residual guilt borne by a person who successfully plead self-
defense had no legal consequences. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 186-88 (Philadelphia
1803).
9. N. HURNARD, smpra note 2, at xi.
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common law never relieved homicide defendants who pled self-defense of the
burden of showing that they acted from necessity and without malice.
More recently, in the United States there has been movement away from
the common law requirement that homicide defendants pleading self-defense
bear the burden of showing that malice was not present. Currently, the
majority of states require that prosecutors bear the burden of showing that
defendants pleading self-defense acted with malice.' 0
What point is served by this brief legal history? It serves to sharpen the
original question by pointing out that the law gradually has moved from a
position which treated all killings by private individuals as wrongs of some
sort to the point where all jurisdictions recognize a right to kill in self-defense.
Is this movement something which a rational person should welcome? Would
it be better to reinstate the position that all killings by private individuals are
wrongs of some kind (even if some are excusable)? Would it be best of all to
go further still and hold that no defensive killings by private individuals
should ever be permitted? Obviously, these questions cannot be settled by
seeking proper legal authorities (the older the better) who approve or
disapprove (conditionally or unconditionally) of private lethal self-help. If the
proper method is not to appeal to authorities or tradition, though, then how
should one approach these questions?
Intuitions are not much help. Consider the following two cases. In the
first, the question is raised whether A should be permitted to employ lethal
force against B solely on the grounds that B has a capacity or is acquiring a
capacity which is used by fifty percent of those who possess it to mount deadly
attacks. In the second, it is asked whether A should be permitted to employ
preemptory lethal force against B solely on the grounds that B has announced
his firm intention to attack A on the day when his (B's) spinning of a roulette
wheel drops the ball on the number twenty-five. Would the answers to these
questions become more intuitively clear if the strategy Plato uses in The
Republic were employed and the situations were "writ large" with the
stipulation that A and B stand for states? If there were a defensible judgment
about the permission to use preemptory lethal force in one case or another, it
would not hinge solely on a difference between the probabilities involved.
The primary concern of this article is not with the marginal complexities of
the law on self-defense. The questions raised here instead concern the
desirability of having a conditional lethal self-help rule of any sort and
whether a single theory can account for relieving from criminal liability a
legitimate defender who kills an innocent third party in the process of
exercising his conditional permission. To deal with this type of case
rationally, a theory is needed which makes it possible to distinguish good
normative inferences from bad ones-a theory which allows coherent,
comparative judgments about the desirability of alternative legal states of
affairs. What theory fits this description?
10. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 221 (1972).
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Professor Polsby believes that the theory should be utilitarian. I He thinks
that this point of view provides reasons to prefer a broad conditional
permission to kill in self-defense to an unconditional prohibition against the
private use of lethal force. 12
Of the many. fascinating questions which Professor Polsby's paper raises,
two are addressed here. First, what reasons does he have for thinking that
utilitarianism is the best theory? Second, what reasons does Professor Polsby
have for thinking that conditional legal permission to use lethal force in self-
defense is better than an unconditional prohibition of it?
II
WHY UTILITARIANISM?
The basic precept of utilitarianism is providing the greatest good for the
greatest number. Described more precisely, utilitarianism is a normative
moral theory in which the good is made prior to the right; that is, criteria for
judging what is worthwhile are independent of and prior to judgments about
what people are duty-bound to do. If happiness is of supreme value, then
people are duty-bound to bring about as much of it as possible. Thus, as a
theory of obligation (telling people what they are duty-bound to do),
utilitarianism asserts that one must bring about the state of affairs which, of all
those feasible, contains at least as much total value (or as high an average
value) as any available alternative. Utilitarianism presupposes the existence of
a concrete method which enables computation of value aggregates
interpersonally and calculation of total or average value for society as a whole.
It is also a maximizing theory, which requires every feasible marginal gain in
value to be brought up to the point where the costs of efforts to do so promise
no net gain.
Utilitarians tend to regard legal liberties, claims, powers and immunities as
instrumental social values (because of their causal connection with the
production of happiness or welfare). In addition, utilitarians prefer that these
entitlements be distributed in such a way that they maximally contribute to
social welfare. Individuals hold entitlements not on their own account, but
because of the resulting social advantages. Whether private individuals
should be permitted to kill in self-defense and, if so, under what conditions,
will be determined solely by the probable social welfare effects. The same will
be true when determining criminal liability for killing innocent third parties
and the allocation of burden of proof requirements in criminal proceedings.
All deontological theories contrast with utilitarianism; they all deny what
utilitarianism asserts. Specifically, they deny that the sole right-making
characteristic of actions, rules, or laws is the causal role they play in
maximizing either total or average welfare. Actions, roles, or laws can be
11. See Polsby, Reflertions on V iolence, Guns, and the Defensive U se of Lethal Force, LAW & CONTr,,I'.
PROBS., Winter 1986, at 89, 94.
12. Id. at 96, 98-110.
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right because of the way they distribute good or evil. For example, some
deontological theories hold that there is an obligation to give people what
they deserve independent of any obligation to maximize total or average
utility. For such theories, to whom things happen matters without regard to
any effect there may be on what happens to aggregate social welfare. A rule
permitting a woman to repel a rapist by resorting to lethal self-help would be
justified on the grounds that it apportions desert in accordance with
viciousness. That such a rule would have a deterrent effect upon potential
rapists is serendipitous.
Other deontological theories eschew the goal of designing social
institutions to apportion good and .evil according to virtue and vice.
Contractarian theories hold instead that just social institutions are those
which would be agreed to by rational, self-interested persons under
conditions designed to ensure impartiality. Under this view, a lethal self-help
rule would be justified if a rational, self-interested person would prefer the
rule to its denial when provided with the knowledge that society contains
aggressors but in ignorance of whether he himself were peaceable or an
aggressor. For contractarians, it is not the inherent worthiness of rules that
confers whatever binding force they have. Their binding force derives rather
from an argument that they would be chosen under the appropriate
circumstances.
Manifestly, the reasoning involved in proving which rule self-interested
persons would agree to is a different project from determining which rules
would tend to maximize aggregate utility. For the contractarian, those rules
have morally binding force which would be agreed to by rational, self-
interested persons under conditions designed to be fair. If a rule would not
be agreed to under the relevant conditions, its welfare maximizing tendencies
(if any) give it no independent standing in moral argument. 13
For what reasons does Professor Polsby prefer utilitarianism? Part of the
answer seems to be that deontological theories lead to asking questions about
defensive lethal force in the "wrong" way, that is, in an unfruitful way. As an
example of an unfruitful way to pose the question, Professor Polsby offers the
following: "[W]hy should an apparently lethal attacker forfeit his life [to his
intended victim]"?14 After all, if the person is insane or is acting from an
extreme mistake of fact, he does not deserve to be killed for it. As Polsby is
quick to point out, however, putting the question in terms of desert misses the
mark. The law does not require that an attacker let his victim take his life;
neither does any deontological theory. Therefore, this question is the wrong
manner in which to frame the inquiry but it constitutes no argument against a
distinctively deontological way of asking.
In Professor Polsby's next example of how deontological theories ask
questions in an unfruitful manner, concepts distinctive of some of these
13. The best-known contemporary version of this theory is found ih J. RAwis. A TIIEORY OF
JUsTl (1971).
14. Polsby, supra note 1 I, at 93 (emphasis in original).
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theories are introduced-those of desert and rights. 15 Polsby presents for
consideration an attempted arrest of a suspected misdemeanant who resists in
such a way that the officer defensively shoots and kills him. 16 Professor Polsby
claims it is not proper to say that police officers have a right to kill recalcitrant
misdemeanants.' 7 Nor should it be said that such misdemeanants deserve to
be killed for their "mulishness." Professor Polsby is surely correct in these
claims-but what does that show about deontological theories? It seems
perfectly natural to .say (and Polsby seems to agree) that the officer had the
right (that is, he was permitted on moral and legal grounds) to defend himself
from reasonably expected harm by minimally sufficient means. On the other
hand, it would be quite odd to say that the officer, in killing the
misdemeanant, was innocent of wrongdoing because he was maximizing total
(or average) expected utility. Of course, the utilitarian could say that the
principle of utility provides a criterion for judging rules rather than actions.
This argument is true enough, but the deontologist need not be limited to
asking questions about self-defense in the moralistic terms Professor Polsby
suggests. In sum, there is no reason for thinking that utilitarianism
encourages one to ask more fruitful questions about social policy than
deontological theories do.
The question that Polsby wants to ask is: "What lethal force rule will, over
the long pull, produce the least amount of wrongful and (potentially) deadly
violence in society?" A utilitarian could take an interest in finding out the
right answer to this question, but he would not be the only one interested. A
social contract theorist could be equally interested in an answer because
rationally self-interested persons may choose to live under the violence-
minimizing rule. It would remain for the contract theorist to prove that
rational, self-interested persons would choose the violence-minimizing rule in
order to have an argument for its adoption. Presumably, rational, self-
interested persons have an indirect interest in various policies' social welfare
effects, but they are also interested in exercising and protecting their own
autonomy. The moral relevance of the question for the contractarian consists
in its interest for rationally self-interested persons who would be obligated to
abide by those rules to which they freely consent. Similarly, a libertarian who
supported a free market on the grounds that it was the only social
arrangement which institutionalized freedom would be interested in an
answer to Professor Polsby's question because he would think that the
violence-minimizing rule would show proper respect for personal autonomy
and enhance peaceable transactions as well.
Since each of the above theorists would be interested in Professor Polsby's
question, it may be difficult to determine which theorist is the most natural
candidate for answering the question. The strategy Polsby in fact employs in
searching for an answer to his question, however, does not look distinctively
15. Id. at 94.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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utilitarian. In fact, he admits as much when he abandons a task which would
require gathering data and assigning cardinal values to outcomes and
multiplying these values by their respective probabilities.' 8 In turning to
rational choice models, Professor Polsby employs a strategy which seems most
at home in a contractarian theory like the one advanced byJohn Rawls. Rawls
is famous for his ambitious attempt to show how his two well-known
principles of justice can be derived as theorems in the theory of rational
choice under uncertainty.' 9 Perhaps one can interpret Professor Polsby's
arguments as attempting to make it plausible to think that a conditional lethal
self-help rule is a stable (or the least unstable) solution to a game theory
model of aggression and that it should be preferred on that ground.
Professor Polsby argues for the preferability of a lethal self-help rule in
two ways. 20 Initially, he argues by appealing to the results of a computer
simulation performed by Richard Dawkins in which five strategies regarding
aggression compete against one another. It turns out that the "retaliator"
strategy, one which involves reciprocity and retribution, beats strategies of
determined aggression, threatened aggression, and pacificism (these are not
Dawkins' labels).2 1
These results provide insight into the preferability of permitting lethal
self-help as opposed to prohibiting it. In an environment which is known to
contain aggressors, prohibiting lethal self-help penalizes the law-abiding by
causing aggressors to fear defensive violence from the police only and not
from their law-abiding victims. It seems objectionable for the law to permit
aggressors to gain so much from their victim's disposition to be law-abiding.
A strict reciprocity rule is not, however, a lethal self-help rule. A lethal
self-help rule permits those who reasonably believe themselves under deadly
threat by an aggressor to "trump" the aggressor's threat by killing him. A
strict reciprocity rule would permit a person who reasonably felt threatened to
place his aggressor in a position to feel comparably threatened. In contrast,
the lethal self-help rule is anticipatory and preemptory. Reciprocal
threatening is not requried. The trump move may come as a complete
surprise.
In his next argument, Professor Polsby appeals to recent work on the
much studied two-person game called Prisoners' Dilemma. 2 2 In the classic
formulation of the game, it turns out that the strictly dominant strategy for
each player, "never cooperate," results in making each party worse off than he
would have been had the players been able to trust each other and cooperate.
The situation changes, however, when the one-round game becomes an n-
round ("round robin") game. A computer simulation which placed more than
six dozen strategies for Prisoners' Dilemma in competition showed that the
18. Id. at 110-11.
19. SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 1-192.
20. Polsby, supra note 11, at 98-101.
21. See R. DAWKINS, FilE SELFIHS GENE 71-94 (1976).
22. Professor Polsby relies on Axelrod & Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE
1390 (1981).
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simplest strategy, "TIT FOR TAT," submitted by Professor Rappaport, beat
all the other strategies. 23
A formal proof of the stability of TIT FOR TAT has been produced by
Nigel Howard in his theory of metagames.2 4 This theory extends the concept
of strategy to include one player's responses to possible strategy choices of his
opponent, the opponent's responses in turn to the first player's conditional
responses, and so on. Thus, a metastrategy is the strategy for selecting a
strategy. Professor Howard proves that what was not a stable strategy in the
original game becomes an equilibrium point in the n-player, n-level
metagame expansion. Unfortunately, the noncooperative strategy is also an
equilibrium. The practical importance of this result hinges upon the extent to
which actual persons operate from a metagame point of view; it is probable
that few do.25
Professor Polsby notes several differences between the TIT FOR TAT
strategy and our own lethal self-help rules. The most important dissimilarity
he mentions is the one alluded to earlier; that is, unlike TIT FOR TAT, the
citizen who reasonably believes himself under an aggressor's deadly threat
may raise the stakes preemptorily and kill the aggressor. 26
Unless it can be shown that lethal self-help rules are equivalent to TIT
FOR TAT, the game theory results to which Professor Polsby refers are
unavailing in his apology for the rules. He addresses this issue with the
following argument:
The anticipatory rule is a translation, not a transliteration, of the TIT FOR TAT rule
into real life. It rests on the assumption that the capacity to foretell the very short-
range future is an adequate substitute for awaiting the perfection of some harm. In
other words, it supposes that the certainty of perfected action can be approached by
anticipation when certain information is known.
2 7
The argument seems to be: In close encounters of the lethal kind,
requiring a defender to restrict himself to reciprocating an attacker's previous
move leaves the defender without his full complement of moves. In such
situations, the defender is permitted to replace reaction based upon certain
knowledge about what the aggressor has already done, with preemption based
upon knowledge of what the aggressor is likely to do next unless he is
disabled.
This argument offers a good basis for supplementing TIT FOR TAT with
lethal self-help rules but it is no proof that lethal self-help rules and TIT FOR
TAT are equivalent. Although no attempt at proof is made here, it is
probable that adding a lethal self-help rule to TIT FOR TAT would make a
difference to the outcomes of games, and if this result is so, the two rules
23. Id. at 1393.
24. N. HOWARD, PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY: THEORY OF METAGAMES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
(1971).
25. For an excellent discussion of Howard's theory of metagames, see S. BRAMS, PARADOXES IN
POLITICS (1976).
26. Polsby, sepra note 11, at 102.
27. Id.
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cannot be equivalent. Perhaps a justification (as opposed to a demonstration
of equivalence) could be given by pointing to the unfairness of a rule which
permitted one of the game's players to undertake a course of action which
deprived the player's opponent of his full complement of moves without the
opponent's consent.
It might be argued that rational, self-interested persons would not consent
to play a potentially deadly game of TIT FOR TAT unless it were
supplemented by a conditional lethal self-help rule. Two points, however,
should be noted about this suggestion. Even if successful, the suggestion
would not show that TIT FOR TAT and lethal self-help are equivalent,
although it might be possible to derive both from some conception of
fairness. Second, it is a contractarian way of arguing and not a utilitarian
approach.
III
INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES AND UTILITARIANISM
Professor Polsby presents his strongest argument for utilitarianism when
he turns to the question of whether the law should permit legitimate
defenders to escape criminal liability for injuring or killing innocent third
parties in the course of using deadly force against an aggressor. He argues,
quite correctly, that no account of deadly force which merely weighs the self-
interest of individuals could explain why the law fails to hold criminally liable
persons who injure or kill innocent parties in the course of using otherwise
privileged lethal self-help. It may not be hard to understand how the law
could give the nod to the defender in a lethal encounter, but how could it fail
to hold him criminally liable when his lethal act causes injury or death to
innocent persons?
Professor Polsby thinks the answer must be sought by reference to public
interests and not private ones:
The innocents cannot seek compensation from the defender because the defender's
privilege is grounded on public necessity rather than on his private interest in self-
preservation. Put differently, the innocent is "compensated" ex ante because the rule
that allows his safety to be suddenly appropriated yields a world that is, on average, a
safer place for him to inhabit. 28
There are difficulties with this explanation. Suppose that an attacker, in
the hope of enhancing the success of his attack, seized an innocent third party
and used that person as a shield in such a way that the defender could halt the
attack only by shooting through the innocent shield. Further suppose that the
law relieved the defender of criminal liability if he chose to perform the only
act reasonably thought necessary to halt the attacker's deadly designs. If the
law permitted this action, it would not be surprising if the law did not require
the defender to use lethal self-help only in such a way as not to endanger
bystanders, for if it did so require, it would have the effect of turning
28. Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
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bystanders into partial innocent shields for the attacker even though he had
not seized them. If a utilitarian justification is unnecessary to account for the
first permission, it should not be necessary for the second. A principle of
fairness would seem to recommend that the law refrain from imposing what
would amount to a duty of heroic self-sacrifice on ordinary citizens (that is,
those without special obligations in this regard, as in the case of police and
soldiers). Thus, the ordinary citizen would not be required to refrain from
the only means reasonably thought necessary to stop a deadly attack which
was under way. Furthermore, since the law permits the ordinary citizen to
escape criminal liability when, in acting from a reasonable but false belief, he
kills someone who is in fact no threat, then by the same reasoning he should
be relieved of liability to third parties whenever he acts reasonably.
Professor Polsby intriguingly suggests that the promise of a net public gain
is needed to secure the defender's immunity from criminal liability for
innocent parties he may injure or kill when exercising permissible lethal self-
help. 29 The background principle seems to be the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
criterion, which claims that one state of affairs is efficient (and therefore
better) when compared to another if and only if those whose welfare increases
at the expense of others could fully compensate those whose welfare
diminishes. 30 As it is usually conceived, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not
require actual payment of compensation to those whose welfare diminishes.
Professor Polsby suggests that in this case compensation actually is paid, but it
is paid ex ante.3'
If full compensation is actually paid (ex ante), then the immunity given to a
defender on the grounds that it is Kaldor-Hicks-better would also be
recommended as Pareto-better. 32  One situation is Pareto-better than
another, however, only in the case where at least one person's welfare is
improved by moving to it and no one's welfare is made net worse. It is
difficult to accept that the innocent third party who is killed is not made net
worse-unless one supposes that the years of greater security enjoyed by the
victim prior to his untimely death fully compensate him for the loss of a
longer, if somewhat more insecure, life and that it would be judged so from the
victim's point of view.
29. Id. at 104.
30. See Kaldor, Wrelfare Propositions of Economics and Inteipersonal Comparisons of Utility. 49 ECON. J.
549, 550 (1939).
31. Polsby, supra note 11, at 104.
32. One situation is Pareto-better than another if and only if it makes at least one person better
offand no one worse off. If those who gain as a result of the move from one situation to another gain
enough so that after fully compensating those who lose they still prefer the second to the lirsi, then
the second situation is both Kaldor-Hicks-better and Pareto-better. Cf. Coleman. Efficiency. "tilit,. and
ll'ealth Miaximization,. 8 HOFSTRA L. RFv. 509, 513 (1980).
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IV
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Professor Polsby's article clearly points out that when interests conflict, the
position which the law takes on the matter by distributing entitlements will
inevitably enrich one side and make the other side worse off. If the law
conditionally permits citizens access to the means and permission to use lethal
force in their own defense, then potential attackers are made worse off
because they run the risk of facing law-abiding victims who are not as helpless
as they might have been otherwise. This distribution of entitlements may
deter some aggressors from undertaking attacks which would have been
otherwise attractive. On the other hand, if the law unconditionally forbids
lethal self-help, then potential attackers are made wealthier because they can
assume that insofar as their potential victims are law-abiding, they pose no
deadly threat. This result leaves total expectable costs of attractive attacks
only marginally greater than those they already risk paying should legal
authorities catch, convict, and incarcerate them. 33
In sum, there is a problem with the way in which utilitarianism asks us to
think about crime. It is tempting to think that reductions in or even an
abolition of violent crime would be desirable on utilitarian grounds. A good
utilitarian must be mindful, however, of the costs to be paid in the transition,
and there would be significant social costs in reaching such a goal. A
reduction or elimination of deadly encounters would put many law
enforcement personnel out of work and might result in staffing law
enforcement institutions with less able personnel. The market for security-
oriented products would be adversely affected. Violence is a big business not
only for those criminals whose activities make it all possible. All those who
marginally benefit from the untimely death of the victims of violence would
suffer a reduction in their opportunities. A utilitarian may believe that the
social costs of criminal violence exceed the social costs of reducing or
eliminating such violence, but apparently no utilitarian has attempted to
prove this belief. Ideally, it should be unnecessary to prove first that the
marginal costs of our current level of violence exceed the costs of moving to a
substantially less violent state of affairs before we are justified in preferring
the latter. It is impossible to believe that the "correct" theory of political
morality requires that the utility functions of those who prefer to be predators
should be weighed equally with those who prefer to be peaceful.
33. Expectable costs of attractive attacks are marginally greater than the disvales of arrest.
conviction, and jail multiplied by their respective probabilities because the attacker must allow some
probability that his potential victim will not be law-abiding with respect to ownership of the means
and employment of lethal self-help. There is always a legitimate question whether criminals actually
engage in calculations of this sort. Evidence suggests, however, that thev do. See Kleck, lolicY Lesson's
from Recent Gun Control Research, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 35.
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